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I. INTRODUCTION
Richard Leo is uniquely suited to illuminate and critique the practices and
legal standards surrounding police interrogation in America. Many courts and
legal scholars through the years have opined on the legal standards adhering to
confession law, without a deep understanding of how interrogation are actually
conducted in the real world, or of the psychological pressure points that ultimately
bear on the matter. Prior to entering legal academia, however, Leo served as an
associate professor of psychology and criminology, and performed groundbreaking
empirical research into how police interrogators obtain confessions and how their
interrogations techniques affect suspects.' Now, as a law professor at the
University of San Francisco, Leo's new book Police Interrogation and American
Justice, deeply forges social science with legal scholarship to create an
enlightening picture of the modem interrogation room, the contradictions and
failures of our laws designed to regulate confessions, and the paths we must take to
ensure the integrity and fairness of confessions in the future.
Although interrogation practices, long veiled from public eye, have remained
one of the "darkest corners of the American criminal justice system," Leo's
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analysis, as he notes, is "based largely on the type of data most other scholars do
not have access to: direct observations of hundreds of police interrogations." (P.
5.) Leo's additional research includes attendance at numerous police interrogation
training seminars, analysis of interrogation training manuals published from 1940
to the present, and conducted in-depth interviews over the past decade with scores
of interrogators and suspects. His research further includes a thorough review of
police reports, trial transcripts, and interrogation tapes of more than 2,000 felony
cases involving confessions. (P. 5.) It is fair to say that there are few, if any,
scholars who have witnessed the interrogation battlefield from the trenches, as has
Leo.
Leo blends his knowledge of interrogations in practice with his deep
understanding, as a law professor and legal scholar, of American interrogation law.
His powerful combination of law, psychiatry, and hands-on experience gives Leo a
perspective on police interrogation that few others share.
Leo provides his insights on questions that he understands are broader than
the interrogation rooms where they play out. He writes:
As a symbolic matter, police interrogation is a microcosm for some
of our most fundamental conflicts about the appropriate relationship
between the state and the individual and about the norms that should
guide state conduct, particularly manipulative, deceptive, and coercive
conduct in the modern era. In short, police interrogation and confession-
taking go to the heart of our conceptions of procedural fairness and
substantive justice and raise questions about the kind of criminal justice
system and society we wish to have. (P. 1.)
Moreover, police interrogations are a frequently repeated scene in cinema and
television because they are a "richly textured narrative and morality play involving
innocence and guilt, good and evil, and justice and injustice .... The drama and
power struggle of interrogation hold our rapt attention as they feed our vicarious
desire for justice, catharsis, and ultimately, resolution and restoration." (P. 2.)
Leo's purpose is to highlight contradictions imbedded in American police
interrogation methods and the law designed to regulate them. The overarching
contradiction is that the police need confessions to solve crimes, but there is almost
never a good reason for a suspect to confess. The tension created by this inherent
contradiction leads to several additional contradictions: interrogations remain
secret in what is considered one of the most democratic and open societies in the
world; police have created "scientific" interrogation techniques that are, in reality,
unscientific and unreliable; the law requires that confessions be voluntary, but
interrogations are successful because they are designed to convince suspects that
they have no choice but to confess; "the truth" is the stated goal and virtue of
police interrogation, yet police routinely rely on lies and deception to obtain
confessions; police view confessions as reliable, while in reality they are
"orchestrated" and "constructed" by the police in a way that is often misleading
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and unreliable; and juries view confessions as the most probative evidence of guilt,
but they are, in fact, quite often unreliable or even patently false.
While complaints about police interrogation methods have sometimes
centered on police brutality, fair play, or human dignity, Leo's loudest complaint is
the risk of false confessions by innocents that modem interrogation techniques
sometimes produce and modem confession law fails to adequately regulate. Thus,
his ultimate suggestions for reform focus on policy and doctrinal improvements to
reduce the number of false confessions and ensure that confessions admitted at trial
are trustworthy. Among these suggested reforms are implementing a legal
corroboration requirement for confession admissibility in the courtroom, and
requiring the videotaping of what takes place in the interrogation room from
beginning to end.
Let me admit at the outset that with respect to me, at least, Leo is preaching to
the choir. Leo's research has been very important in my own development as a
confessions-law scholar.2 I am a fan. When I first met Richard a few years ago, I
was shocked that he was not an elderly white-haired professor with a cane, such is
the depth of his body of work. And as the director of an Innocence Project, the
problem of false confessions is not just an abstract scholarly interest to me, but
something with which I have had to grapple in real life.
While many in law enforcement may object to Leo's analysis and
conclusions, he is not an enemy of police interrogation. He argues, and I agree,
that when done properly, police interrogation is "an unmitigated social benefit"
that renders "enormously important outcomes." (P. 2.) He notes that he has
trained police interrogators in numerous states, and served on advisory committees
to police departments. (P. 8.) Leo contends that it is critical not to undermine the
ability of the police to perform their important function of interrogating suspects,
but rather to educate others so that the quality and reliability of confessions can be
improved.
Nevertheless, based on my own experiences in attempting to reform
interrogation practices in my home state, I know that many will read Leo's book as
a broad attack on the institution of police interrogation. Some will write it off as a
liberal diatribe of a scholar who does not "understand what the police are up
against, and what really goes on in the interrogation room." Unfortunately,
because many police departments continue to resist opening up their procedures to
examination and study,3 and continue to resist videotaping of interrogations, a
procedure that would provide a comprehensive record for further study, we will be
2 See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False Confession Discovered, 10 CHAP. L.
REv. 623 (2007) (symposium) (extensively citing Leo's works); Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the
Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REv. 781 (2006)
(same).
3 See Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OH-IO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309 (2003) (noting
resistance of many police departments to taping interrogations); Shaila K. Dewan, Police Resist Fully
Taping Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2003, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A06E3D71538F93 1A3575ACOA9659C8B63.
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unable to fully resolve this dispute. Until law enforcement allows closer scrutiny
of its practices, they are on thin ice when attacking Leo's conclusions.
This review is divided into three parts. Part II summarizes Leo's empirical
findings with respect to interrogation procedures in the real world. Part III
examines Leo's suggested reforms. Part IV offers my own critiques and insights.
II. THE INTERROGATION PROCESS IN AMERICA
A. Police Interrogation and the Adversary System
Leo asserts that the proper role of the police is to gather case information in a
"neutral and dispassionate manner" at the "preadversary stage" of the criminal
process. (P. 19.) The information police collect must be as complete and unbiased
as possible, because, in the first instance, prosecutors must use this information to
decide whether to charge the suspect, and therefore, commence formal adversarial
proceedings against him. When the adversary system later officially commences
with the filing of criminal charges, judges, defense lawyers, and ultimately juries
rely on the integrity of the neutral fact-finding process performed by the police.
Historically and today, police have gone to great lengths, through court testimony
and other information disseminated to the public about the investigation process, to
cast themselves in this neutral fact-finding role.
If police, on the other hand, are committed to the prosecutorial agenda in their
fact-collecting process, and develop evidence in a biased manner with the end of
obtaining a conviction, then the formal adversary system starts off-kilter. The
perceptions about the case held by the crucial actors in the real adversary system-
prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges and juries-become distorted. This can lead
to erroneous results through a "garbage in, garbage out" sequence.
Based on his empirical research, including many interviews with police
interrogators, Leo asserts in Chapter 2 that the police have internalized the values
and goals of the adversary system. They see themselves solely as foot soldiers for
the prosecution in a war zone-a combat arena. They are "highly partisan,
strategic, and goal directed." (P. 11.) They are trained to assume that the suspects
they interrogate are guilty, and that all suspects will initially lie about their guilt.
(P. 22.) Detectives perceive the innocent man in the interrogation room as an
"urban legend perpetuated by naive liberals, muckraking journalists, or self-
serving criminal defense attorneys." (P. 22.) Their job, as interrogators, is to
obtain a full confession, which they then label as "the truth." Moreover, the
interrogation process is aimed not simply to obtain an "I did it" confession, but to
manipulate from the suspect a police-orchestrated narrative designed to ensure a
conviction, and even better, a conviction by guilty plea. (P. 22.)
Thus, the reality, says Leo, is that the police interrogation process is not a
neutral, "Just the facts, Ma'am", evidence-gathering process. Leo writes, "Once
police have decided to interrogate a suspect, they have, in effect, crossed the line
that separates police work from prosecutorial work. They have aligned themselves
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with the prosecution in orientation and goal; their function at this point becomes
more prosecutorial than investigative." (P. 23.)
In one of many contradictions that pervades the interrogation process, the
police shield their true roles from the courts and the public by keeping
interrogations hidden from public view, and then putting a spin on what actually
occurs in the interrogation through their well-developed "external impression
management" strategies. (P. 35.)
The police not only hide their role in the adversary system from the courts and
public, they also hide it from the suspects they interrogate. Modem interrogation
is "fraudulent" not only because police are permitted to lie to suspects about the
evidence they have collected (fingerprints, DNA tests, etc.), but because detectives
seek to create the illusion that they share a common interest with the suspect and
that he can escape or mitigate punishment only by cooperating with them and
providing a full confession. Although the suspect's self-interest would usually be
best served by remaining completely silent, interrogators seek at every step to
convince him that what is in their professional self-interest is somehow in his
personal self-interest. The entire interrogation process is carefully staged to hide
the fact that police interrogators are the suspect's adversary. While they portray
themselves as seeking only to "collect the facts" and to help the suspect if he
cooperates, they, of course, try to construct a damning case against him. (P. 25.)
Leo asserts that the "genius and fraud of psychological interrogations ... lies
in its ability to persuade ... the suspect to view the act of self-incrimination-and
thus self-conviction-as both logical and rational under the circumstances." (P.
28.)
The interrogation process is additionally fraudulent because suspects rarely
get the attractive deal that detectives imply that they will get from self-
incrimination. Typically, those who confess receive the opposite of what they
were promised-"more and higher charges, more and harsher punishment." (P.
33.) Thus, the suspect is deceived not only about the role of the police in the
interrogation process, but the consequences of confessing.
I suspected when first reading Leo's assertions here that he was preparing for
an Escobedo-type4 argument that suspects must have an attorney present in the
interrogation room, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Indeed,
Leo makes a case, reminiscent of arguments heard during the Escobedo era, that
police interrogation is the most crucial and most adversarial part of our criminal
justice system. He ultimately does not take the Sixth Amendment route, as we will
see, perhaps because he deems such a remedy unlikely to be adopted, or perhaps
because he sees such a remedy as snuffing out police interrogations altogether-a
medicine he does not espouse.
Rather, Leo makes the case that police interrogators see themselves as foot
soldiers for the prosecution in our adversary system with two goals in mind: to
provide an introductory context for his later recitation of how interrogations unfold
4 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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step-by-step in the real world, and to help us understand how police attitudes can
ultimately lead to unreliable confessions. This last point sets the stage for his
concluding chapters, where he lays out his recommended reforms.
Admittedly, Leo describes the values and goals of detectives during
interrogations in absolute and broad terms. One might criticize his analysis by
suggesting that he paints with too broad of a brush. It is Leo does not mean to
suggest, however, that in every interrogation the police automatically assume the
suspect is guilty, and that in every interrogation the police attempt to bend the
suspect's confession to fit their desired version of the facts, regardless of the truth.
Rather, Leo is generically describing overarching values that, according to his
research, permeate police culture today.
In any event, my response to such criticism strikes a theme that will be
frequently repeated in this review. Leo has examined and studied actual
interrogations, and conducted interviews with real detectives and suspects, perhaps
to a greater extent than any other scholar today. If law enforcement critics wish to
rebut Leo's perhaps overbroad generalizations, they need to open up the
interrogation process to scrutiny by more widely adopting the videotaping
requirement that has been urged by many scholars, legislators, and courts or years.
B. Police Interrogations in the Real World: Yesterday and Today
1. Exchanging the nightstick for the polygraph machine
Chapters 2 through 5 of Leo's book describe the evolution of the real-world
interrogation process in the past century. Leo asserts that an historical
understanding of the evolution of interrogation process is necessary to an
understanding of police attitudes toward interrogation today. (P. 46.)
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the "third degree," which describes the physically
brutal interrogation techniques frequently employed by detectives to coerce
confessions from suspects prior to the Supreme Court's 1936 decision in Brown v.
Mississippi.5 The tortuous interrogation tactics utilized in this era have been
adequately described in prior publications6 and even in popular media, and need
not be recounted in great detail here.
Leo states that the use of the third degree waned after Brown through the
1940s, dissipated even more during the 1950s, and then became rare to "non-
existent" by the 1960s. (P. 45.)
Acknowledging our country's unfortunate history of interrogation practices is
important, however, because Leo contends that many aspects of modem
interrogation practices evolved from the third degree. The Wickersham Report,
5 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
6 See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, REP. ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (WICKERSHAM COMM'N REP.) (1931).
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the Brown decision, and later Miranda v. Arizona,7 forced detectives to alter
interrogation strategies from physical torture to psychological coercion. But many
vestiges of the third degree remain. Specifically, the basic values and goals
embraced by detectives in the interrogation room remain fixed in a third-degree
mentality. Namely, the suspect subjected to interrogation is always guilty, he will
lie about his guilt, and the detective must use whatever means and tricks he can
legally get away with to obtain not just a confession, but an orchestrated narrative
that will guarantee a conviction. (P. 77.) The basic goal of interrogation is the
same as it was a century ago: convince the suspect that he has no option but to
confess, and that it is in his self-interest to do so. Leo notes that this mentality is at
odds with our constitutional requirement that confessions be voluntary to be
admissible in court.
The police's insistence on secrecy, and keeping the public and courts in the
dark about what occurs in the interrogation room, is another attitude that was
burned into police culture in the era of the third degree, and to which police
departments continue to cling today. (P. 77.)
The third-degree era taught police departments that the easiest and most
expedient way to investigate a case was to coerce a confession from a suspect at
the front end of the investigation. In a sense, it made police investigators lazy,
hampered the development of their broader investigative skills, and fostered the
habit of leaning on the "home run" confession to clear their crowded case dockets.
Leo asserts that this over-reliance on confessions, learned during the earlier era,
remains a hallmark of police interrogation today. Leo writes:
[T]he decline of the third degree is also a story about the persistence of
police institutions and behavior. For the structure of early American
interrogation remains largely intact to this day, even if the content has
changed .... As in the era of the third degree, the primary goal of police
interrogators is not to elicit the truth per se but to incriminate the suspect
in order to build a case against him and assist the prosecution in
convicting him. And interrogation still often occurs in secrecy.
Contemporary American police have skillfully adapted to the norms of
the adversary system, but like their predecessors, they do not aspire to be
impartial fact-finders. Rather, they are still essentially agents of the
prosecution. And they also continue to exercise a virtual monopoly of
power at the front end of the criminal justice system, manipulating
suspects to provide damning testimonial evidence against themselves
before any of the adversary system's checks and balances can be
meaningfully applied. The seeds of modem interrogation were sown in
the era of the third degree, and they have left an indelible, if largely
hidden, imprint on contemporary police methods. (P. 77.)
7 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Before turning to his depiction of modem interrogations, Leo pauses in
Chapter 3 to describe the emergence of new interrogation weapons developed by
police departments to secure confessions without physical violence. Leo asserts, in
short, that police interrogators have traded the nightstick and Billy club for pseudo-
scientific lie detection devices. Indeed, the police now employ lie detection
techniques as a means of coercing confessions. They do so by routinely coaxing
the suspect under interrogation into taking a polygraph so "we can close the case
and let you go." They then invariably inform the suspect that he has failed the
polygraph-even if he actually passed. Supported by the aura of scientific proof of
guilt, a suspect told he has failed the polygraph often comes to believe that he must
be lying and simply does not remember committing the crime, or, as the
interrogator is eager to verify, that all hope is lost, no one will now believe his
innocence, and that confessing to obtain the implied mitigation in punishment is
the only rational option.
Leo cites studies showing that polygraphs and the like are accurate no more
than sixty to seventy-five percent of the time. (P. 89.) Even more troubling is the
fact that, when inaccurate, they are more likely to classify a truthful suspect as a
liar rather than a lying suspect as truthful. Furthermore, behavior analysis-
reading the suspect's nonverbal cues and then classifying him as truthful or
untruthful-is even more unreliable and prone to error. (Pp. 98-99, 104-05.) And
worse still, police interrogators often receive just a day or two of training in
"demeanor evidence," and leave convinced that they can "see through" lying
suspects, when studies suggest that even an expert well-trained in such techniques
has mastered a "science" that has no verifiable reliability.
As a result of police training manuals and interrogation seminars, police
officers possess a deep belief in the "oracle-like" status of the polygraph and other
lie detection methods. Leo argues that the contemporary reliance on these sham
techniques for "divining truth" is no better than trial by ordeal in ancient societies.
(P. 81.)
Apparently however, the polygraph alone "was not an adequate substitute for
the third degree. Police reformers also turned to the field of psychology, which
like the polygraph carried the symbolism and authority of modem science." (P.
80.) From these related arenas, "the house of modem psychological interrogation
was built." (P. 80.) Today, interrogation is comprised of two elements: "the
studied detection of deception and the use of psychologically manipulative
methods." (P. 80.)
2. Modern interrogation
Modem interrogation techniques, Leo contends, are seeped in fraud,
manipulation and deception. (P. 120.) Police have developed fraud-based
interrogation techniques because they assume that every suspect under
interrogation is guilty and needs some coercion and trickery to come clean, and
because the police "view themselves as agents of the prosecution and thus the
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suspect's adversary." (P. 120.) Fraud and psychological coercion are present in all
four stages of modem interrogation outlined by Leo: the "softening up" phase, the
Miranda warning phase, the interrogation proper, and the post-admission phase.
(P. 121.)
The "softening up" stage comes first. The goal of this stage is to disarm the
suspect by making him believe that the police simply need to ask him a few
questions to help them solve the crime. The encounter is called an "interview"
rather than an interrogation. The subject is typically told either that he is not a
suspect, or that the police just need a few minutes of his time so that they can
check him off the suspect list. (Pp. 121-23.) Hidden from the suspect is the fact
that the interrogators have prejudged his guilt, that he is about to be intensely
interrogated, and that the sole goal of the interrogators is to obtain a confession for
the prosecution. (P. 122.)
The first step is to establish a rapport with the suspect. Police will often
flatter or ingratiate themselves with the suspect to create the appearance of a
nonadversarial relationship. One detective explained the goal of this stage to Leo
as follows: "I don't care whether it is rape, robbery or homicide ... the first thing
you need to do is build rapport with that person.. . I think from that point on you
can get anybody to talk about anything" (P. 123.) In short, police interrogation is
the first and perhaps most adversarial part of the adversary system, but the
"softening up" stage is designed to turn that truth on its head.
After the police have convinced the suspect that the purpose of the
"interview" is nonadversarial, and built a rapport with him, the next stage is to
move the suspect past the Miranda warnings while convincing him that he need
not invoke any of his rights. Leo contends that police have "developed multiple
strategies to avoid, circumvent, [and] nullify" Miranda, and indeed, "work
'Miranda' to their advantage." (P. 124.)
One way that detectives avoid Miranda is to falsely tell the suspect that he is
not in custody and that he is free to leave at any time. Because Miranda warnings
are only required when the suspect is in custody, police will "invite" the suspect to
the station for an "interview," and inform him that: "You're here on a voluntary
basis. You elected to come in here on your own and I appreciate that, okay? And I
told you on the phone I had no intention of arresting you." (P. 125.) The officer's
true intention-interrogating the suspect until he confesses and then placing him
under arrest-is, of course, never revealed.
Another way police interrogators frequently attempt to avoid Miranda is
simply to read the suspect his rights and then move straight into the questioning
without giving the suspect a chance to absorb the warnings or invoke them. If the
"softening up" stage has been executed properly, a suspect will feel it is
unnecessary or inappropriate to invoke his rights. If the suspect begins answering
the officer's questions, as they typically do, courts will hold that he has implicitly
waived his rights. (Pp. 125-26.)
Police interrogators increase the chances that the suspect will not invoke his
rights by minimizing, downplaying, and de-emphasizing the importance of the
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warnings. The goal is to convince the suspect that the Miranda warning/waiver
procedure is "akin to standard bureaucratic forms that one signs without reading or
giving much thought to." (P. 126.) The softening up stage, which precedes the
warnings, is important here, because it establishes a "norm of friendly
reciprocation and the expectation that the suspect will comply." (Pp. 126-27.)
Police interrogators further deemphasize the warnings by reading them in a
"perfunctory tone" and "bureaucratic manner." They do so without pausing or
making eye contact with the suspect, all while implying that the warnings are
merely a "matter of routine" and that it is a "foregone conclusion" that the suspect
will waive them. (P. 127.) In some instances, the interrogator will expressly
inform the suspect that the warnings are an unimportant formality that needs to
quickly be "dispensed with" so that the police can interview him and check him off
the suspect list. (P. 127.) In other cases, interrogators will persuade the suspect
that he must waive Miranda and talk, because it will be his only chance to "[T]ell
his side of the story" and get the matter cleared up quickly. (Pp. 128-29.)
Leo contends:
If the Supreme Court in Miranda sought to "level the playing field" by
having detectives notify the suspect that they are his adversary and that
the suspect's best interest may not be served by making statements that
will be used against him, then the strategies that American interrogators
use to obtain signed waivers have, in effect, turned Miranda on its head.
Miranda is often little more than a continuation of the softening up phase
of the interrogation. As in other stages, the detective's strategy is to
create the illusion that he and the suspect share the same interest and that
compliance is to the suspect's advantage. (P. 128.)
After the Miranda warnings, the interrogator may ask the suspect a few
questions, but then quickly moves on to the third stage. At this stage, the focus
changes from asking the suspect questions to "telling him the answers and
imploring him to confess." (P. 132.) The aim of the third stage is to move the
suspect from denial to admission. At the base of every interrogation is the same
message: "the suspect stands to receive intangible or tangible benefits and avoid
harms in exchange for an admission-ideally a full confession-to some version
of the offense." (P. 133.) His confession is "quid pro quo for an end to the
interrogation and avoidance of the worse-case scenario-harsher treatment or
punishment." (P. 133.)
Police interrogators induce suspects to confess by introducing negative
incentives and offering positive incentives. Negative incentives "break down the
suspect's resistance, reverse his denials; lower his self-confidence; and induce
feelings of resignation, distress, despair, fear, and powerlessness." (P. 134.) After
the suspect is broken down, positive incentives are offered "to motivate him to see
the act of complying and admitting to some version of the offense as his best
available exit strategy and option, given his limited range of choices and their
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likely outcomes." (P. 134.) The Los Angeles Police Department's interrogation
training manual captures this strategy by encouraging detectives to tell suspects:
"You did it. We know you did it. We have overwhelming evidence to prove you
did it. But the reason makes a difference. So why don't you tell me about it." (P.
134.)
Common negative incentives include harsh accusations that the suspect
committed the crime, and accusations that he is lying. These accusations are
repeatedly made. The suspect's denials are cut-off, and attacked with further and
repeated accusations. Repeated accusations exert psychological pressure on the
suspect, and shift the burden of proof. Suspects rarely understand that the
prosecution has the burden of proving the case against them. The message instead
is that the interrogation will not end until the suspect convinces the police of his
innocence, or confesses. Because the police make clear that they do not believe
that he is innocent-and never will-the only option to end the interrogation
becomes a confession.
Police interrogators strengthen their position at this stage by using false
evidence ploys. Evidence ploys are used to convince the suspect that he has no
choice but to confess. These tricks include falsely telling the suspect that an
eyewitness saw him commit the crime, that his fingerprints have been found on the
murder weapon, that his crime was caught on tape by a hidden video camera, or
that his DNA was found on the victim's body. Because suspects rarely understand
that the police can lie to them during an interrogation, they begin to see their
position as hopeless. (Pp. 138-44.)
At this point, polygraphs and other forms of lie detection are typically brought
into the picture. Suspects are told, "It's 100 percent accurate. There's no fault in
it." (P. 145.) Suspects are then invariably told that they failed the polygraph. This
ploy is intended to "break down a suspect's resistance by persuading him that he
has been exposed, that his denials are futile, and there is no escape from the
necessity of admitting guilt." (P. 145.) This process of accusations, attacking
denials, and using false evidence ploys is repeated over and over, often combined
with raised voices, screaming, and relentless badgering. As one suspect recounted
to Leo:
They just kept on and on. Hounding and hounding and hounding.
Finally, I said yes, so they'd just leave me alone .... I don't even know
what they said .... I tried to repeat what they said. I try to ask them. "I
don't know what you're talking about." I was just tired. It was just like
arguing with her. Finally ... they told me I was done .... I thought I
was going home. I didn't go home. It was just like a big dream, just like
something that just never happened.... I was so tired. It was like being
so confused. (P. 148.)
After a suspect is convinced that no one will ever believe his claims of
innocence, and that his situation is hopeless, interrogators dangle some positive
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incentives. The basic idea of positive incentives is simple: he will receive less
punishment or "some form of police, prosecutorial, or juror leniency if he
confesses, but he will receive greater punishment if he does not." (P. 151.)
Combined with this incentive is a warning that this is the suspect's only chance to
receive mitigation. It is "your opportunity to present your side of the story ...
before it is too late." A common phrase uttered by interrogators is: "For me to
help you, I need to hear your side of the story. . . . I need to understand what
happened." (P. 151.)
After the suspect breaks down and makes an admission-"Okay, I'll tell you
what you want to hear. I did it"-the final stage of interrogation begins. This
post-admission stage involves the construction of a narrative. Leo describes this
stage not as the confession-taking stage, but the confession-"making" stage. (P.
166.) He asserts that if the suspect's details do not match the interrogators vision
of the crime, the detectives will remain adversarial and combative, and will repeat
many of the negative and positive incentives introduced in the pre-admission stage.
The post-admission narrative is not a document in which the interrogator simply
acts as a stenographer; "[riather, it is actively shaped and manipulated-with the
suspect's participation to be sure, but at the interrogator's direction." (P. 166.) If
the suspect's narrative does not fit the detective's expectations, the interrogation
continues, with facts often supplied by the detective, until the suspect and detective
have a meeting of the minds on all important details. (P. 167.)
The detective's goal is to obtain a story that not only fits his conception of the
crime, but that will be believable and dramatic in court, thus guaranteeing a
conviction. The five things good interrogators strive to obtain in this last stage are:
(1) a coherent and convincing script; (2) a description of the suspect's motives and
explanations; (3) a display of knowledge of the crime's intimate details that would
only be known by the true perpetrator; (4) a description of what the suspect was
feeling at crucial moments; and (5) a strong acknowledgment that the confession is
voluntary. (P. 168.)
Leo states that these five goals are obtained through intense pressure.
Detectives often suggest emotions and motives for the suspect to adopt. They
might, through their questioning and badgering, reveal nonpublic facts about the
case that the suspect understands he is supposed to incorporate into his narrative.
(Pp. 170, 172.) A trick used by interrogators to make the confession appear more
reliable is, after the narrative is complete, to personally write it out by hand while
intentionally inserting errors on trivial facts. The interrogator will then ask the
suspect to review the confession and correct any errors by replacing incorrect facts
with correct ones, and to initial each change. In court, the marked up confession,
replete with corrections by the suspect, gives the appearance of a defendant who
was in full control in the interrogation room and directing even the intimate details
of the confession with confidence. (P. 176.)8
8 Leo provides numerous examples of this police practice of intentionally inserting mistakes
for the suspect to correct and the powerful effect such corrections later have in court, in TOM WELLS
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C. The Result: False Confessions and Miscarriages of Justice
Many American courts have for years "reasoned that police deception during
interrogation is legally permissible because it is not 'apt to lead an innocent
suspect to confess."' (P. 190.) Surveys and interviews of jurors, police officers,
and prosecutors suggest that this belief is widespread. (Pp. 196-97.) Leo's
extensive body of work on the subject, however, summarized in Chapters 6 and 7,
demonstrates otherwise. He calls this misimpression the "myth of psychological
interrogation." (P. 197.) The myth is perpetuated because of the secrecy
surrounding modem interrogation; most people simply do not understand how
highly manipulative, deceptive and stressful interrogation can be. (P. 197.)
No one can put a percentage on the number of confessions that are false. But
the advent of widespread post-conviction DNA testing has revealed that false
confessions are disturbingly more common than most believe. Indeed, DNA
testing is like a crystal ball, allowing us to look back at old cases and see with great
clarity whether a confessor is truly guilty. The DNA revolution can be a great
learning moment for the criminal justice system, if we are open to the lessons
taught.
False confessions are one of the leading causes of wrongful conviction of the
innocent, second only to eyewitness misidentification. 9 The following chart (p.
244) depicts various studies of wrongful conviction cases, and the number and
percentage of those convictions that relied on false confessions:
Author/year No. in study No. of false % Wrongful
confessions convictions due
to false
confessions
Bedau and 350 49 14
Radelet (1987)
Leo and Ofshe 60 60 N/A
(1998, 2001)
Warden (2003) 42 25 60
Drizin and Leo 125 125 N/A
(2004)
Gross et al. 340 51 15
(2005)
Innocence 200 31 16
Project (2007);
Garrett (2008)
& RIcHARD LEO, THE WRONG Guys: MURDER, FALSE CONFESSIONS, AND THE NORFOLK FOUR (2008)
[hereinafter 'THE WRONG Guys"].
9 See INNOCENCE PROJECT STATISTCs, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
Leo outlines the four ways in which confessions can be discredited. One way
is when it is later conclusively proven that the crime did not occur. In one case, for
example, several defendants were convicted of murder based on their confessions
and a witness's testimony that the defendants had killed her newborn baby and
disposed of the body. Scientific evidence later established, after the defendants
spent years in prison, that the woman had never had a baby; she had had a tubal
ligation operation that prevented her from getting pregnant. (P. 241.)
The second way confessions are proven false occurs when it is demonstrated
that it would have been physically impossible for the defendant to have committed
the crime. In three different Chicago cases, for example, defendants who
confessed were later proven to have been in jail on the date that the crimes
occurred. (P. 241.)
Third, a confession is proven false when the identity of the true perpetrator is
later discovered. Chris Ochoa, for example, spent years in prison for armed
robbery, rape, and murder, until the true perpetrator came forward, confessed, and
led the police to the murder weapon and bag where he had hidden the fruits of the
crime.1° (P. 241.)
The final, and most common, way, that a confession is proven false is when
DNA evidence conclusively clears the inmate. Examples of this method are too
numerous to discuss. Indeed, today, 234 individuals have been conclusively
proven innocent through post-conviction DNA testing, with the number constantly
on the rise."' An alarming percentage of these innocent suspects falsely confessed
as a result of extreme psychological interrogation. I have personally handled two
false confession cases in Ohio that are not counted in this group of 234.
Common sense tells us that this number is just the tip of the iceberg. The
majority of serious crimes, like armed robbery and murder, are often "non-DNA"
cases. In these cases, the crime occurred in such a way that the perpetrator did not
leave his or her DNA at the scene. 12 And in most would-be DNA cases, the police
do not preserve the DNA after conviction and appeal. In Ohio, for example, in
two-thirds of the cases where inmates have sought post-conviction DNA testing,
the crucial DNA that could have proven innocence or guilt once and for all had
10 For details of Chris Ochoa's exoneration, see
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/43.php.
1 See Innocence Project website for profiles on all 220 cases, at
http://www.innocenceproject.org.
12 For example, if A walks up to B in his backyard and shoots and kills him, and then leaves
the scene, it is likely that no DNA will exist to identify A as the perpetrator. The fact that most DNA
exonerations have occurred in rape cases is simply because rape is the type of crime where the
perpetrator most often leaves his biological material. DNA testing in rape cases has proven many
rape confessions to be false.
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been destroyed or lost by the time the inmate requested testing. 13 This percentage
is typical of the sorry state of DNA preservation in other states as well.
14
There is no qualitative difference between cases in which DNA testing exists
to prove innocence and the vast majority of the remaining cases where no DNA is
available. The same interrogation techniques are used in both types of cases. The
234 DNA exonerations, with the alarming number of false confessions these cases
have laid bare, are just a small percentage of the total number of cases where false
confessions may have occurred. The confessions in the remaining cases, however,
cannot be demonstrated true or false because no conclusive check exists on the
backend to verify the validity of the confession. By any measure, however, the
myth that innocent suspects simply do not confess is patently wrong.
Leo next outlines three types of false confessions based on a typology
developed by Kassin and Wrightsman. 15 (P. 199.) A voluntary false confession
occurs when a citizen suddenly confesses on his own, subject to no police
coercion. The mentally disturbed defendant in Colorado v. Connelly16 falls into
this first category. (Pp. 200-01.)
The coerced-compliant false confessor, on the other hand, is a suspect who
privately knows while he is confessing that he is innocent. This type of suspect
confesses because the extreme interrogation tactics, including false evidence ploys,
convinces him that his situation is hopeless, he will be convicted, and that the only
way he can get the interrogation to end, and simultaneously avoid harsher
punishment, is to tell the interrogators what they want to hear. This type of
confessor comes to rationally believe that confessing is his only option, and the
lesser of two evils.' 7 (Pp. 201-10.)
The final type of false confession is the coerced-internalized confession. This
type of suspect, hearing the "overwhelming" evidence of his guilt the police have
laid at his feet during the interrogation, and not knowing that this evidence is
fabricated, comes to doubt his own memory and believe that he must have
committed the crime. This type of confessor comes to believe that he either
committed the crime while sleepwalking or in an alcohol-induced blackout, or that
13 See Geoff Dutton and Mike Wagner, Lost Hope: When DNA Evidence Goes Missing, So
Does the Chance for an Exoneration, THE COLuMBuS DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 2008, available at
http:l/www.dispatch.comllivelcontentllocalnews/stories/2008/01/27/dnal .html.
14 Id.
15 Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightman, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EvIDENcE AND TRIAL
PROCEDURE (1985) (Chapter 3, Confession Evidence).
16 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
17 Perhaps the best examples of how false confessions occur can be found in Richard Leo's
new nonfiction work, with Tom Wells, THE WRONG Guys, see supra note 8. In this book, Leo
describes from beginning to end how several defendants in that case gave coerced-complaint
confessions to a crime they did not commit.
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he has simply suppressed his memories of the crime because they are too painful to
accept.' 8 (Pp. 210-225.)
Although false confessions are highly counterintuitive, and often difficult to
wrap one's mind around, one can understand how they occur by reading
examples-by examining the actual case studies. Leo provides numerous detailed
case studies of each type of false confession. Each story is uniquely compelling.
A reader of these case studies can come to fully understand how the suspect would
falsely confess as a result of extreme psychological pressures. Other compelling
depictions of how false confessions can be manufactured are found in John
Grisham's nonfiction work The Innocent Man,' 9 and in Leo's co-authored non-
fiction story, entitled The Wrong Guys,20 which describes the numerous false
confessions made by the "Norfolk Four." Although providing narrative depictions
of interrogations that led to false confessions is beyond the scope of this review,
readers who wish to understand this phenomenon should read one of these two
excellent books.
There is more to the story. Part of the problem, says Leo, is that detectives
are engrained with the belief that all suspects they interrogate are guilty. Training
seminars have convinced detectives that they are "highly accurate human lie
detectors," thus building false confidence in their biased intuition of guilt. Leo
asserts that this phenomenon is both wrong and dangerous. (P. 226.) He writes:
In the more than 2,000 interrogations I have studied, I have rarely
encountered interrogators who remember most of the specifics from the
laundry list of supposed nonverbal and verbal indicators of deception
taught by interrogation training firms such as Reid and Associates.
Rather, detectives tend to confidently believe that they can reliably infer
whether a subject is lying or telling the truth based on their own intuitive
analysis of his body language and demeanor. They sometimes refer to
their superior human lie detection skills as stemming from a "sixth
sense" common to police detectives. The unfortunate effect is that
interrogators will sometimes treat their hunch (or "gut") as somehow
constituting direct evidence of the suspect's guilt and then confidently
moving to an aggressive interrogation. In my analysis of disputed
confession cases, I have found that interrogators are often more certain in
their belief in a suspect's guilt than the objective evidence warrants and
tenaciously unwilling to consider the possibility that their intuition or
18 Joe Dick, one of the Norfolk Four described in Leo's book THE WRONG Guys, see supra
note 8, provided several coerced-internalized false confessions. Dick's interrogators were so
convincing that he continued to falsely believe that he had participated in the crime many months
later.
19 JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOwN
(Doubleday 2006).
20 See THE WRONG GuYs, supra note 8.
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behavioral analysis is wrong. These tendencies may be reinforced by an
occupational culture that teaches police to be suspicious generally and
does not reward them for admitting mistakes or expressing doubts in
their judgment. (P. 229.)
False confessions also occur because, in cases in which little evidence of guilt
exists, the detectives are convinced in their "gut" that the suspect is guilty, so they
become Hell bent on obtaining a confession. (Pp. 229-30.) In cases where ample
evidence of guilt exists, on the other hand, police may not need a confession or
may decide to refrain from interrogation altogether. As a result, extreme
psychological interrogation occurs most often when police have relied on little
more than their own hunch or intuition to determine guilt. And, as Leo has
demonstrated, these intuitions and gut-feelings are often wrong.2' Thus, extreme
psychological interrogations do their work most often in cases where strong
evidence of guilt is lacking, and thus, in cases where suspects are most likely to be
innocent.
A confession is usually seen by actors in the criminal justice system-
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges and jurors-as one of the most powerful
indicators of guilt. (P. 248.) As a result, when a false confession exists, it is often
admitted into evidence at trial and the defendant is convicted as a result of his
confession. Studies show that once a suspect falsely confesses, he possibly has
more than an eighty percent chance of being wrongfully convicted. (Pp. 250-51.)
HI. THE NECESSARY REFORMS: POLICY DIRECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE
Leo's suggested reforms not surprisingly revolve around the necessity of
reducing false confessions. At the outset, he rejects the idea of abolishing police
interrogation. He believes that interrogation, properly done, is both a necessary
and valuable tool to solve many crimes. (P. 271.) He further dispenses with the
suggestion of others that the interrogation function be performed by prosecutors,
magistrates, or judges. (P. 271.) Leo contends that prosecutors and judges should
remain unburdened by the interrogation process, to ensure that they do not become
tainted by the inquisitor's role. (P. 271.)
The reforms Leo urges come in two forms: legal and practical. Leo first
suggests reinvigorating the reliability rationale of the due process voluntariness
test. Reliability played an important role in determining the admissibility of
confessions for much of American jurisprudential history, until the Supreme Court
21 To further illustrate the point, DNA testing performed at the FBI laboratory of suspects
identified by police investigation excluded 20 percent of the primary suspects, and resulted in a
match with the primary suspect in only about 60 percent of the cases. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE
OF JUSTICE PRoGRAMS, PUB. No. 161258, CONvICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE To ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFrER TRIAL xxviii (June 1996).
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undermined that policy rationale in Colorado v. Connelly.22 I have previously
echoed these same concerns, noting that Connelly was ironically decided shortly
before the DNA Revolution commenced, which cleanly laid bare the problems
with false confessions and the dire need for a reliability focus in determining
confession admissibility.23
Leo's primary legal focus is on the creation of a new reliability test. A judge
should not admit a confession into evidence, Leo argues, unless he or she has
weighed three factors and determined the confession is trustworthy. These factors
are:
(1) whether the confession contains nonpublic information that can be
independently verified, would be known only by the true perpetrator or
an accomplice, and cannot likely be guessed by chance; (2) whether the
confession led the police to new evidence about the crime; and (3)
whether the suspect's postadmission narrative fits the crime facts and
other objective evidence. (P. 289.)
This "totality of the circumstances" analysis should be performed after the
court has determined that the confession is voluntary. The prosecution would have
the burden of establishing trustworthiness by a preponderance of the evidence. (P.
290.) Of course, for this sort of analysis to work properly, all interrogations would
have to be videotaped from beginning to end. Judges would need an objective
record by which to analyze and weigh these three prongs. As discussed later, Leo
believes that taping should be a universal requirement.
The legal basis for such a reliability test can be found in Federal Rule of
Evidence 403.24 Although an unreliable confession may still be minimally relevant
under this rule, it is not particularly probative of the suspect's guilt. And because
confession evidence weighs so heavily in the minds of jurors, an unreliable
confession is unfairly prejudicial to a defendant and devastating to the innocent.
(P. 290.) Leo contends that this sort of screening on trustworthiness grounds is not
"new or novel." (P. 290.) It routinely occurs with respect to other types of
evidence, including most out-of-court hearsay statements.
Leo's primary practical reform goes hand-in-hand with the new reliability
test-a requirement of universal videotaping of interrogations from beginning to
end. He notes that this reform has picked up momentum in recent years, with
several states now requiring taping either by statute or court decree. (P. 292.)
22 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (Due Process Clause is not violated by the admission of an unreliable
confession if the state did not coerce it).
23 See Godsey, Reliability Lost, supra note 2.
24 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 excludes evidence if the risk of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs its probative value.
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Similar legislation is pending in several states across the country, including my
home state of Ohio.
2 5
Leo believes, and I agree, that a broad requirement for videotaping
interrogations is the single most important reform. (P. 296.) The benefits of this
reform are legion. First and foremost, videotaping creates a clean, objective, and
comprehensive record of an interrogation-the equivalent of instant replay. This
would prevent false confessions from leading to wrongful convictions in three
ways. First, after-the-play scrutiny of police conduct would help professionalize
police departments. It would ensure that police play within the bounds of
permissible interrogation techniques. Second, it would allow experts to analyze
the tape before trial. This opportunity is crucial because expert witnesses could
look for earmarks of reliability or falsity, such as whether the police fed the
suspect facts to adopt, or whether the suspect truly came up with nonpublic facts
on his own. Third, videotaping would provide judges with an objective record to
make the three-pronged inquiry in Leo's new reliability test.
Taping protects the police by preventing suspects from making false claims
that they were abused in the interrogation room, or that the police officer failed to
recite Miranda warnings. It removes secrecy from this important part of our
adversarial process and "eliminates the gap in our knowledge that the Supreme
Court complained of more than four decades ago in the Miranda decision." (P.
297.) Law enforcement agencies benefit because a tape recording of a reliable
confession is rock-solid evidence at trial. (P. 301.)
Taping also furthers the investigative abilities of the police. Indeed, things
said by a suspect during an interrogation may seem unimportant at the time. As
the investigation progresses, however, new facts give rise to new angles. A tape
allows the police to go back and capture the suspect's original statements that,
without such a clean record, might have been forgotten by the interrogators or gone
unnoted. (Pp. 300-01.)
Recording also saves time and money, drastically cutting down on the time
police, prosecutors, judges and juries must litigate disputes regarding what was
said in the interrogation room. When interrogations are recorded, fewer pretrial
suppression motions are made, and fewer claims are made that the police neglected
Miranda's dictates. (Pp. 301-02.) Finally, recording improves relations between
the police and public. By "removing secrecy from interrogations, recording should
increase public perceptions of the legitimacy of the criminal justice system more
generally." (P. 303.)
Studies show that taping does not decrease the frequency of confessions. (P.
303.) And complaints about cost have not been borne out by departments that
have adopted such requirements. In this day and age, recording equipment is
25 See S.B. 358, 127th Leg., Reg. Session (Ohio 2008). See also Geoff Dutton and Mike
Wagner, Proposed Reforms Shown to Work, THE COLuMBus DISPATCH, Feb. 24, 2008, available at
http://www.dispatch.comlive/content/1ocal-news/stories/2008/02/24/DNA-fix.ART-ART-02-24-
08_A1_R29EO33.html.
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inexpensive, hours of recording time can be saved on an expensive digital hard
drive, and any minimal costs are offset by the cost-benefits of reduced litigation to
the entire criminal justice system. (P. 303.) Objections from law enforcement
about operator mistakes or equipment failure are resolved in states that have a
recording requirement by implementing "safety valves," or exceptions when
recording is not possible or resulted from unintentional error. (P. 304.)
Finally, Leo proposes several "piecemeal" reforms to fight against false
confessions. These reforms include improving police interrogation training,
requiring probable cause to interrogate, prohibiting implicit and explicit threats and
promises, banning false evidence ploys, imposing time limits on interrogations,
providing additional protections for vulnerable populations such as the mentally
handicapped and juveniles, embracing in-court expert testimony on the reliability
or unreliability of confessions, and improving jury instructions.26 Requiring
probable cause to interrogate, and banning false evidence ploys, are perhaps the
two most controversial of his suggested reforms. I will discuss these reforms
further below.
IV. CRITIQUES, INSIGHTS AND ADDITIONAL REFORMS
Two broad questions were in my mind when I finished reading Leo's book.
The first is whether Leo's conclusions about the attitudes of detectives toward
interrogation and their suspects, how interrogations occur in the real world, and the
frequency with which false evidence ploys and extreme psychological coercion are
used, are entirely accurate. The second question is whether the problem of false
confessions outweighs potential benefits to our society from modem forms of
psychological interrogation. I cannot definitively answer either question.
Regarding the first question, I, like most scholars, am limited by the fact that I
have not performed decades of empirical research as has Leo. To truly test Leo's
claims I would have to review the tapes of the thousands of interrogations he has
studied over the past decades, or perform my own empirical research to determine
whether his sample set is representative.
We all have our beliefs and biases about police interrogation, however,
whether stemming from television, scholarship, or real world experience. I have
limited personal experience with interrogations. I participated in several
26 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in 2004 that:
[W]hen the prosecution introduces evidence of a defendant's confession or statement that
is the product of a custodial interrogation or an interrogation conducted at a place of
detention . . . and there is not at least an audiotape recording of the complete
interrogation, the defendant is entitled (on request) to a jury instruction advising that the
State's highest court has expressed a preference that such interrogations be recorded
whenever practicable, and cautioning the jury that, because of the absence of any
recording in the case before them, they should weigh evidence of the defendant's alleged
statement with great caution and care.
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E. 2d 516, 533-34 (Mass. 2004).
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interrogations with federal law enforcement agents as an Assistant United States
Attorney, including a twelve-hour interrogation in which the suspect ultimately
made incriminating statements leading to a prosecution for murder. None of the
psychological techniques or false-evidence ploys described in Leo's article were
used. But I was not present for the vast majority of police interrogations that I
later introduced into evidence in court. And I have no real world experience, either
as a participant or voyeur, outside of that limited realm.
My instincts suggest that Leo is more or less on point, however. Leo's
empirical research is extensive. He has probably witnessed, either live or on tape,
more actual interrogations than many veteran police interrogators in high-crime
urban centers. But, whether his conclusions are biased, I cannot say. This brings
me to the point I made in the introduction of this review. I suspect that Leo's most
enthusiastic critics will be law enforcement personnel. Such critics should be
deflected with a single point. If law enforcement personnel wish to prove Leo
wrong, they must open up the process for further scrutiny and study. Those who
hide the ball are on thin ice to complain that others have mischaracterized the
situation.
I experienced my first resistance to videotaping interrogations in my first
weeks as a federal prosecutor in 1995. A suspect and his attorney from another
state came in for a "proffer session," an "interview" conducted by an FBI agent
and me to determine if he was a suitable candidate for cooperation against other
suspects in the same conspiracy. The suspect's attorney asked that the session be
videotaped. It seemed like a reasonable request to me. I then asked my supervisor
if I could videotape the encounter, but received a strong rebuff. I was informed
that such a request was against the policies of the United States Department of
Justice. The supervisor explained that the "public would not understand the things
we have to do."
More recently, as Director of the Ohio Innocence Project, I have worked to
have videotaping legislation passed in Ohio.27 I have given talks in support of the
legislation to prosecution groups, sheriffs associations, and police unions across
the state. So far, I mostly have been met with stiff resistance. The chief of police
of a major Ohio city was quoted as saying that the legislation demonstrates "a great
distrust of law enforcement." 28 To law enforcement critics of Leo's conclusions
about police attitudes and values in the interrogation room, I respond that you do
not have a leg to stand on until you allow widespread videotaping, so that Leo's
assumptions can be empirically put to the test by a variety of scholars across many
spectrums.
My second question is whether the current risk of false confessions outweighs
the benefits to society of intense psychological interrogation. We all know the
27 See Dutton & Wagner, supra note 25.
28 Jim Siegel, Columbus PD Finding Problems With New DNA Bill, THE COLuMBUS
DISPATCH, Aug. 21, 2008, available at
http:/blog.dispatch.com/dailybriefingl2008/08/columbus-pdfinding-problems-w.shtml.
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maxim that it is "better that 10 guilty persons escape than that one innocent
suffer."2 9  But what if current interrogation methods result in one thousand
convictions of murderers and rapists who would otherwise still roam the streets for
each innocent person who falsely confesses? The bottom line is that we simply do
not know-and cannot know-the true costs involved in the various tradeoffs
between competing interests. It is quite possible that all of Leo's suggested
reforms could be implemented with little to no loss of prosecutions of the guilty.
But Leo does not pretend to know. Rather, he identifies the problem of false
confessions, which is real, and then prescribes medicine to remedy this problem
without any report on the side effects of this medicine. Leo apparently believes
that the current state of affairs is simply unacceptable regardless of the unknown
costs his proposed reforms might entail. Where others fall on the spectrum of
choices may be a matter of personal politics.
Nevertheless, I wholeheartedly agree with two of Leo's suggested reforms:
the need for universal videotaping and the need for judges to vigorously screen out
unreliable confessions under Rule 403 for the reasons he stated. Videotaping
opens up the process. It professionalizes interrogation practices. Detectives know
that judges and juries will later scrutinize their behavior in the interrogation room.
Detectives can still push hard for much needed confessions, but the eyes of
outsiders provide a check against egregious practices. Videotaping also provides
an objective record for future litigation. It cuts down on litigation by ending false
claims of abuse or Miranda failure. Most importantly, it allows the interrogation
to be reconstructed after-the-fact by experts and courts to determine a confession's
reliability.
And Leo's case for a renewed emphasis on confession reliability as a
prerequisite to admission is overwhelming. Leo selects Evidence Rule 403 as the
regulator of unreliable confessions. I have made the case in a California Law
Review article that a stringent requirement for confession reliability is inherent in
due process.30 Through a series of doctrinal errors, beginning in Brain v. United
States31 and culminating in Colorado v. Connelly,32 the Court stripped the
reliability factor from the due process inquiry,3 even as DNA testing began to
shed light on the serious problems of unreliable and false confessions resulting in
wrongful convictions in this country.34  For both legal and policy reasons,
reliability needs to find a home in our confession law jurisprudence. This home
could rest both the Due Process Clause and in Rule 403, as Leo suggests.
29 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Clarendon Press 1765).
30 Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for
Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REv. 465 (2005).
31 168 U.S. 532(1897).
32 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
33 See Godsey, Reliability Lost, supra note 2.
34 Id.
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Leo's other reforms-embracing expert witnesses on the reliability issue,
improving police interrogation training, and creating new jury instructions to deal
with the issue of unreliable confessions-are all needed reforms. Coupled with
videotaping and a new thrust toward screening out unreliable confessions on the
front end, these reforms together would go a long way toward minimizing the
harmful impact of false confessions.
In one respect, I would go farther than Leo. Leo seems to give up on the ideal
of improving Miranda, but I believe that Miranda can be revitalized to some
extent, to help it achieve its intended function. I made the case in a Minnesota Law
Review article that an additional warning should be added: "If you choose to
remain silent, your silence cannot be used against you. '35 This warning was not
part of the original Miranda warnings because the Court had not yet ruled in
Doyle36 that post-Miranda silence is inadmissible. The Court in Miranda believed
that this Doyle-warning was implicit; suspects will naturally understand that
silence cannot be used against them. 37 But Leo's own empirical research has
shown that suspects do not "get" this right as the Miranda Court believed. Many
suspects feel they have no choice but to talk-and thus are compelled to speak-
simply because of an erroneous belief that silence in the face of damning
38
accusation will equate with guilt in the eyes of the jury.
Leo established that Miranda has little effect, in part because detectives
deemphasize it by reciting the warnings quickly, in a perfunctory tone and then
launching into intense interrogation without giving a suspect the chance to absorb
or consider his rights. His description made me suddenly consider a new way to
combat this Miranda nullifying effect. Now that we are in the digital age, with
universal taping of interrogation within our grasp, I would consider having
Miranda warnings recited to suspects in custody by a judge or defense attorney via
videotape. Much like the "seatbelt" video one watches on commercial airplanes,
Miranda could be neutrally explained and emphasized in a way that ensures that
suspects truly understand their rights and have time to consider them. Suspects
could then verify in writing that they have watched the video, understand their
rights, and wish to submit to questioning before interrogation commences. Some
have suggested having suspects brought before a magistrate for Miranda warnings
or interrogation. Leo asserts that this improperly crosses separation-of-power
lines. But a video of a magistrate informing the suspect of his rights would help
cure Miranda's ills without infringing on the judiciary's independent role.
Leo also urges the prohibition of any threats or offers during interrogations. I
have a different-although somewhat similar-take on this issue. Although a full
recitation of my admittedly complicated theories about penalties and offers are
35 Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings supra note 2.
36 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
37 See Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings, supra note 2 at 790-92.
38 Id. at 794 (citing Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely:
Rational Choice and the IrrationalAction, 74 DENy. U. L. REV. 979, 1002 (1997)).
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beyond the scope of this review, I have previously set forth an argument that the
Self-Incrimination Clause was designed to regulate this matter to ensure that
suspects are not penalized in any way for exercising their right to remain silent.
39
The reforms with which I continue to struggle are Leo's requirement for
probable cause to interrogate and his proposed ban on false evidence ploys. Leo
argues that detectives should, just like with search warrants, have to go before a
magistrate and establish probable cause before they may interrogate a suspect.
(Pp. 307-08.) I understand his reasons for setting forth such a requirement. Police
interrogate more intensely the more they need a confession. They most need
confessions in cases where other evidence of guilt is weak. The requirement of
probable cause might reduce the risk of false confession.
I also suspect, however, that a large number of serious crimes are solved each
year with reliable confessions that would not have been solved with such a
probable cause requirement 40 If this were the only reform available at this time to
combat the problem of false confessions, I might consider it. I think the proper
balance can be struck, however, by requiring videotaping, a three-pronged
reliability inquiry prior to confession admissibility, embracing expert testimony,
and improving jury instructions. If the only evidence of guilt in a given case is the
defendant's confession, having the interrogation on videotape, so that proper
examination of the confession's reliability can be performed, sufficiently attacks
the problem without eliminating otherwise reliable confessions and convictions
that might be unattainable with such a probable cause requirement.
Finally, I do not have enough data to agree at this time with his proposed ban
on false evidence ploys. Leo argues that it is hypocritical for detectives to hold out
interrogation as a truth-seeking venture when they intentionally intersperse lies in
the interrogation process. And while lying is generally unseemly as a cultural
matter, I am not yet convinced that false evidence ploys do not result in a net gain
in the pursuit of truth. I imagine, but lack data to back it up, that falsely telling a
suspect his fingerprints have been found at the scene often results in a guilty
suspect giving up the game and confessing, allowing scores of crimes to be solved.
In a recent Ohio Innocent Project case, I was convinced beyond probable
cause that an alternate suspect committed the rape for which my client had spent
more than a decade in prison. I interviewed the alternate suspect on the street
along with a retired detective who volunteers for my organization. The alternate
suspect made some strange and semi-incriminating statements, but did not confess.
I must admit that although I did not lie to him, I was tempted to falsely tell him
that our private DNA testing efforts put him at the crime scene. Why? Because I
wanted to see how he would respond. I intuitively believed that he would not
confess unless he knew that the game was over. If he did not confess in response
to this news, I at least wanted to gauge his reaction. Did he quickly provide an
39 See Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule, supra note 30.
40 Leo also does not explain how his requirement for probable cause would work in Terry stop
scenarios based on reasonable suspicion.
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explanation for why his DNA was at the scene, which could later be discounted
through investigation? Did his response give the impression that he was expecting
to hear such news and had premeditated a story to try to explain it away? Or was
he genuinely stumped? This would have been supremely helpful information to
obtain.
Without knowing how many true confessions and incriminating statements
are obtained each year through false evidence ploys, I cannot say that their
tendency to cause innocent suspects to falsely confess outweighs their potential
benefits. And while I agree that a detective lying to a suspect during an
interrogation is unseemly, I believe other reforms Leo has suggested are sufficient.
Detectives will know that their actions will be caught on tape and viewed by a
judge and jury at a later time. Detective will be held accountable for their actions,
and the factfinders will be able to determine whether the suspect's responses
merited the detective's approach. The judge, making a reliability determination
before admitting the tape into evidence, will be able to see whether the false
evidence ploys eventually beat down the suspect and convinced him that he had no
choice but to conjure up a false confession. Or, the judge will see that the false
evidence ploy immediately led to strange and incriminating statements from the
suspect, such as providing non-public information about the crime. Experts will be
able to view such tapes as well, and offer their opinions as to whether the false
evidence ploys had a detrimental effect on the truth seeking purpose of the
interrogation.
V. CONCLUSION
Richard Leo body of work, summarized in Police Interrogation and American
Justice, shines the bright light on police interrogation in American today. He
depicts the values and structure of interrogation in a way that few, outside of the
actual subjects/victims of interrogation, fully understand. Although I do not agree
with all of his conclusions and proposed reforms, his work convincingly raises a
point that we must heed: If we are to ensure the integrity and fairness of
confessions in this country, we must adopt universal videotaping requirements
across all jurisdictions, and develop new reliability tests to screen out false
confessions.

